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Economists and cognitive psychologists have long
known that prior rewards bias decision making in
favor of options with high expected value. Accord-
ingly, value modulates the activity of sensorimotor
neurons involved in initiating movements toward one
of two competing decision alternatives. However,
little is known about how value influences the acquisi-
tion and representation of incoming sensory informa-
tion or about the neural mechanisms that track the
relative value of each available stimulus to guide
behavior. Here, fMRI revealed value-related modula-
tions throughout spatially selective areas of the
human visual system in the absence of overt saccadic
responses (including in V1). These modulations were
primarily associated with the reward history of each
stimulus and not to self-reported estimates of stim-
ulus value. Finally, subregions of frontal and parietal
cortex represent the differential value of competing
alternatives and may provide signals to bias spatially
selective visual areas in favor ofmore valuable stimuli.
INTRODUCTION
Moment-to-moment commerce with the world requires effi-
ciently acquiring and evaluating incoming sensory information
in order to guide adaptive motor interactions with the environ-
ment. Whereas a good deal of research has focused on under-
standing how the quality of sensory information affects this deci-
sion process (Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Shadlen and Newsome,
2001), nonsensory factors—such as the prior reward history of
a stimulus—also exert a strong influence on behavior and on
neural activity in cortical areas that guide motor responses. For
example, Platt and Glimcher (1999) recorded from occulomotor
neurons in the lateral intraparietal area (LIP) during a saccadic
decision-making task in which amonkey had to choose between
a red and a green stimulus; although the spatial position of each
stimulus was unpredictable from trial to trial, the reward associ-
ated with each alternative was known in advance (e.g., 0.1 ml
juice reward paired with the green target, and 0.2 ml paired
with a red target). Even when sensory and motor factors were
perfectly controlled, the firing rate of LIP neurons scaled with
the value of the stimulus in their response field (see also Dorris
and Glimcher, 2004; Glimcher, 2003; Sugrue et al., 2004). Similar
value-related signals have been recorded from occulomotorNneurons in the superior colliculus (Basso and Wurtz, 1997,
1998; Dorris and Munoz, 1998; Ikeda and Hikosaka, 2003),
supplemental eye fields (Amador et al., 2000), posterior cingulate
cortex (PCC; McCoy et al., 2003), and dorsal lateral prefrontal
cortex (DLPFC; Barraclough et al., 2004; Leon and Shadlen,
1999).
Although these studies reveal that value influences activity in
a distributed network of occulomotor areas, many questions
remain unaddressed. First, neurons in most previous studies
were specifically selected for their saccadic response proper-
ties, so the influence of value on neural activity in other areas
of the visual system is not well understood (although see Haenny
et al., 1988; Haenny and Schiller, 1988; Shuler and Bear, 2006).
Second, it is unclear whether reward-related modulations are
driven primarily by the reward history of each available item, or
whether modulations are instead driven by the observer’s overt
assessment of reward probability (henceforth referred to as
subjective value). Finally, little work has been done to examine
the control mechanisms that are involved in biasing spatially
selective areas of visual cortex in favor of more valuable stimuli.
To address these questions, I employed human observers,
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and a paradigm
that required selecting one of two spatially separated targets
that varied in value across the course of the experimental
session. In order to measure value-related modulations within
spatially selective areas of visual cortex in the absence of
saccadic responses, observers maintained central fixation
throughout the task and made manual button-press responses
to indicate their choices. To separately assess the influence of
prior rewards and subjective value, the ‘‘value’’ of each choice
was estimated using a quantitative model based solely on
reward history and also by acquiring subjective ratings from
observers on a trial-by-trial basis. Finally, a whole-brain group
analysis identified regions of frontal and parietal cortex in which
activation levels increasedmonotonically as the differential value
between the two alternatives increased. These signals are
consistent with control regions that act to bias activation levels
within spatially selective areas of the visual system so that
more valuable stimuli win representation at the expense of less
valuable alternatives.
RESULTS
In the behavioral task, 14 human observers tried to maximize the
amount of reward they earned by choosing one of two visually
presented colored alternatives (a ‘‘red’’ choice and a ‘‘green’’
choice; see Figure 1A; task based on Sugrue et al., 2004; Cor-
rado et al., 2005). Rewards were assigned to each color in aneuron 60, 1169–1181, December 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 1169
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reward ratio changing unpredictably after every two blocks of
trials (selected from the set {1:1, 1:3, 3:1}). Once a reward was
assigned to a particular color, the reward remained available
until that color was selected; therefore, the probability of earning
a reward increased as a function of the time since that color was
last chosen. In addition, rewards were never given on trials in
which an observer switched between alternatives (referred to
as a change over delay, or COD; seeCorrado et al., 2005; Sugrue
et al., 2004). Unsignaled changes in the reward ratio and reward
persistence encouraged exploratory choices, and observers
eventually selected each color roughly in proportion to the
reward earned from that alternative, consistent with Herrnstein’s
matching law (de Villiers and Herrnstein, 1976; Glimcher, 2005;
Herrnstein, 1961). Observers did tend to select the red stimulus
slightly more often than the green stimulus, although the devia-
Figure 1. Behavioral Paradigm and Model for Esti-
mating Value
(A) Schematic of trial sequence in behavioral task; 1.25 s after
the observer chose the red or green stimulus, the fixation point
changed to yellow to indicate a reward, or blue to indicate no
reward (see text for more details).
(B) Mean red:green choice ratios across all observers for
scans with a {1:3, 1:1, and 3:1} average red:green reward ratio
(indicated by dotted lines). Error bars reflect ± SEM across
observers.
(C) Filter (open circles) and exponential approximation (solid
line) relating reward history and choice for a single observer.
(D) Relationship between differential value of the red and
green stimuli and the probability of choosing red for the
same single observer (solid line is best-fitting cumulative
normal).
(E) Best-fitting exponential filter relating reward history and
choice for each of the 14 observers (as in [C]).
(F) Best-fitting cumulative normal relating differential value and
choice for eachof the14observers (as in [D]; seealsoTableS1).
(G) Sample distribution of differential value for the same single
observer shown in (C) and (D).
(H) Same data as in (G), but resorted so that differential value
is now defined as the value of the unselected stimulus sub-
tracted from the value of the selected stimulus, collapsed
across red and green alternatives. The solid vertical lines
show the boundaries for sorting trials into five bins based on
differential value for this observer.
tion was modest and only significant when the
red:green reward ratio was 1:3 (leftmost bar in
Figure 1B; t[13] = 2.57, p < .01). Because eye
movements can modulate activity in nearly all
visual areas, observers in the present study indi-
cated their choices via manual button-press
responses so that value-related modulations could
be assessed in the absence of saccades (all
observers were instructed and trained to maintain
central fixation throughout the task, whichwas veri-
fied using eye tracking during scanning in six
observers; see Figures S1–S4 available online).
The first step in examining the influence of value
in spatially selective regions of visual cortex was to
use reward history to estimate the value of each stimulus on
a trial-by-trial basis. Intuitively, the stimulus that is associated
with the most rewards per unit time should be assigned a higher
value and should be selected more often. Thus, in a stationary
environment where average reward ratios are fixed, an observer
should perfectly integrate all past rewards to compute the value
of each stimulus. On the other hand, if reward ratios change
rapidly (say every few trials), an observer should only consider
rewards earned in the very recent past. In the present experi-
ment, where reward ratios changed every 144 trials (every 2
blocks or ‘‘scans,’’ with each scan containing 72 trials), the
optimal strategy falls somewhere in between these two
extremes.
To estimate how previous rewards influenced the choice
behavior of each observer, a filter was analytically derived to
describe the relationship between reward history and choices1170 Neuron 60, 1169–1181, December 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.
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reward history of the selected stimulus and thus describes the
relationship between a reward earned n trials in the past and
choice on the current trial (although see Supplemental Experi-
mental Procedures describing themodel for important additional
details). The filter derived for each subject was well approxi-
mated by either a weighted sum of two exponential functions
(11/14 observers) or a single exponential function (3/14
observers), indicating that recent rewards influenced choices
more than distant rewards (Figures 1C and 1E; Table S1). Using
an exponential function as an approximation was simply a way to
characterize the shape of the filters derived for each subject.
However, the general analysis approach is capable in principle
of recreating arbitrarily shaped functions, so no strong a priori
assumptions about shape were imposed (Corrado et al., 2005).
Given a function that describes how past rewards influence
choice, the value of each stimulus was estimated on a trial-
by-trial basis by convolving an observer’s exponential filter
with a vector describing the reward history of each stimulus (a
vector of 0’s and 1’s marking unrewarded and rewarded trials,
respectively). Thus, if a choice to the red stimulus was rewarded
on the previous trial, then red would be assigned a relatively high
value on the current trial. Conversely, if red was last rewarded
approximately five or more trials in the past, then its value on
the current trial would be relatively low (mean estimated filter
weights across subjects were significantly greater than zero for
previous five choices, all t’s[13] > 3.57, all p values < .01).
Because the goal of the task was to maximize rewards obtained
over the course of the experimental session, observers should
logically choose themore valuable of the two stimuli on each trial
(where ‘‘value’’ in this case is determined solely by recent
rewards). Accordingly, behavioral choices are strongly predicted
by the differential value of the red and green stimuli on each trial
(Figures 1D and 1F; Corrado et al., 2005).
To evaluate the predictive power of the model, data from five
out of six scans were used to estimate the cumulative normal
distribution that best approximates the relationship between
differential value and choice probabilities (see, e.g., solid line in
Figure 1F; Supplemental Experimental Procedures). The height
of the cumulative normal at a given differential value was then
used to estimate the probability of choosing red on each trial in
the sixth scan; when the estimate was greater than 0.5, the
model guessed that the observer selected red, otherwise the
model guessed that the observer selected green. This procedure
was iterated across all six unique permutations of holding one
scan out, and on average the model predicted observer’s
choices on 79% (±0.2% SEM) of the trials. This predictive accu-
racy is reasonably high given the inherently stochastic nature of
human decision making, and is comparable to estimates derived
using highly trained nonhuman primates (Corrado et al., 2005;
see also Supplemental Experimental Procedures for an addi-
tional metric of model performance and Daw et al., 2006; Lau
and Glimcher, 2005; Lee, 2006; Samejima et al., 2005; Seo and
Lee, 2007 for other approaches to modeling stimulus value).
Spatially selective areas in left visual cortex receive sensory
input primarily from the right visual field and areas in right
visual cortex receive sensory input primarily from the left visual
field. This contralateral stimulus-to-cortex mapping permittedNea measurement of the blood oxygenation level-dependent
(BOLD) response evoked separately by each stimulus on every
trial because the two stimuli projected to visual areas in opposite
cortical hemispheres. Spatially selective areas in early visual
cortex (occipital areas V1, V2v, V3v, and hV4) were identified
using standard retinotopic mapping procedures (Engel et al.,
1994; Sereno et al., 1995), and independent functional localizer
scans were used to find the most selective voxel in each of these
areas that responded to the region of space occupied by each
stimulus in themain experimental task (see Supplemental Exper-
imental Procedures). Spatially selective regions of the intraparie-
tal sulcus (IPS; the putative homolog of monkey LIP) and frontal
eye fields (FEF) were identified using a delayed-saccade task in
which observers made eye movements to a remembered spatial
location (Figures S5 and S6; Table S2; Saygin and Sereno, 2008;
Sereno et al., 2001).
Trials were first sorted into five equally spaced bins based on
the differential value between the selected and unselected
stimuli, collapsed across color (see Figures 1G and 1H). Then,
the amplitude of the evoked BOLD response within each value
bin was estimated within visual areas contralateral to the
selected stimulus as well as contralateral to the unselected stim-
ulus (using a general linear model; GLM). Responses assigned to
like conditions were averaged across hemispheres because no
significant differences were observed between left and right
visual areas. Overall, selected stimuli evoked larger BOLD
responses than unselected stimuli (Figures 2A–2G; repeated-
measures ANOVA comparing magnitude of response evoked
by selected and unselected stimuli, collapsed across differential
value levels and visual areas, F[1,13] = 56.7, p < .001). However,
the difference between responses evoked by selected and
unselected stimuli increased as differential value increased
(repeated-measures ANOVA comparing responses evoked by
selected versus unselected stimuli at each differential value
level, collapsed across visual areas, F[4,52] = 7.5, p < .001).
The qualitative pattern shown in Figure 2G was observed in
most visual areas, with the exception of V3v (three-way
repeated-measures ANOVA with visual area, selected versus
unselected stimuli, and differential value as factors did not
approach significance, F[20,260] = 1.0, p = 0.44). In addition,
the interaction shown in Figure 2G was still significant when
‘‘switch’’ trials were removed from the data set, confirming that
the pattern was not simply driven by low-value choices that
never earned a reward (switch trials were never rewarded due
to the COD, F[4,52] = 3.35, p < .025). Finally, the interaction
shown in Figure 2 is unlikely to have been driven by the lateral-
ized manual button-press responses that were required (see
Supplemental Results).
When present, rewards were signaled 1.25 s after the offset of
the stimulus display; therefore, it is possible that the value-
related modulations reported in Figure 2 were influenced by
signals that occurred after the experience of a reward. To test
this account, an additional GLM was performed that included
a regressor to explicitly account for variance in the BOLD signal
related to the presentation of rewards. Just as in Figure 2G, the
difference between responses evoked by selected and unse-
lected stimuli increased as differential value increased, demon-
strating that the value-related modulations were not causeduron 60, 1169–1181, December 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 1171
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ential value bin (Figure 2H; F[4,52] = 7.9, p < .001; the same
general pattern was observed across the visual hierarchy as
the three-way interaction with visual area, selected versus unse-
lected stimuli, and differential value as factors did not approach
significance even when the reward regressor was included,
F[20,260] = 1.1, p = 0.38).
As shown in Figure 2G, the overall amplitude of the BOLD
responses tended to decrease slightly as the differential value
between selected and unselected stimuli increased (repeated-
measures ANOVA for main effect of differential value after
collapsing across selected and unselected stimuli, F[4,52] =
6.6, p < .001). A speculative explanation for this general
decrease in activation levels holds that observers spent longer
making their decisions when the two alternatives were of
approximately equal value (low differential value, leftmost points
in Figure 2G) compared to when one alternative was far more
valuable than the other (high differential value, rightmost points
in Figures 2G). If true, then the longer decision times may have
contributed to larger overall BOLD responses due to time-on-
task effects (D’Esposito et al., 1997). Ideally, decision time could
be indirectly inferred by examining response times (RTs);
however, RTs were not meaningful in the main experiment
because observers were required to respond after the offset of
the stimuli. Therefore, in a separate behavioral study, we tested
for a relationship between decision time and differential value;
stimuli were presented for only 100 ms and observers (n = 5)
had to respond as quickly as possible. RTs systematically
decreased as differential value increased, consistent with the
‘‘decision time’’ explanation (mean RTs decreased from 611
ms to 518 ms; see Figure S7; F(4,16) = 5.9, p < .005). However,
these RT differences cannot account for the interaction between
Figure 2. Influence of Differential Value in
Spatially Selective Regions of Visual Cortex
(A–G) Influence of differential value on BOLD
responses in each identified subregion of visual
cortex (A–F) and mean across all visual areas (G).
Overall responses evoked by selected stimuli
(black lines) and unselected stimuli (blue lines)
diverged as differential value increased.
(H) Same as (G) after including a regressor marking
the onset time of all earned rewards.
Error bars reflect ± SEM across observers.
differential value and the magnitude of
the response evoked by selected and
unselected stimuli because BOLD
responses were measured for selected
and unselected stimuli on the same trials
(thus decision times were equated
between corresponding points along the
black and blue lines in Figure 2G).
Reward History or Subjective
Value?
At least two accounts of the value-related
modulations reported in Figure 2 can be
considered. First, rewards may influence activation levels via
a mechanism that integrates the prior reward history of each
stimulus over a timescale that is appropriate to guide behavior.
Second, value-based modulations might be driven by overt esti-
mates of the probability of earning a reward for making a partic-
ular choice (referred to here simply as subjective value). To distin-
guish these two accounts, observers were asked to report the
subjective value of the selected stimulus on a trial-by-trial basis
(on a scale ranging from 1 [low value: unlikely to yield a reward] to
3 [high value: likely to yield a reward]). These subjective-value
ratings were collected in the scanner at the same time that the
observers selected the red or the green alternative (e.g., pressing
button ‘‘3’’ with your left hand would indicate that you are select-
ing the left stimulus and that you subjectively rate your choice as
‘‘high value’’). Overall, there was a significant correlation
between these subjective ratings and stimulus value as esti-
mated using the quantitative model described above that only
took into account reward history (which will henceforth be
referred to exclusively as differential value to distinguish the
model-based metric from the subjective-value ratings;
Figure 3A; one-way repeated-measures ANOVA, F[2,26] =
21.2, p < 0.001). However, this relationship was driven primarily
by a tendency to rate ‘‘switch’’ trials—which never yielded
a reward because of the COD—as having a low subjective value.
There was no difference between the differential-value levels
associated with subjective-value ratings of ‘‘2’’ and ‘‘3’’ (t[13] =
0.31, p = 0.76). Removing switch trials from the data set substan-
tially attenuated the relationship between subjective and
differential value (Figure 3B; although the relationship was still
significant, one-way repeated-measures ANOVA, F[2,26] =
4.02, p < 0.05; additional two-way repeated-measures ANOVA
comparing magnitude of relationship between subjective and1172 Neuron 60, 1169–1181, December 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.
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p < 0.005, revealing significant difference between Figures 3A
and 3B). Thus, observers seemed to be aware of the fact that
switch trials never produced a reward, but otherwise subjec-
tive-value ratings were not strongly correlated with differential
value, indicating some degree of independence in these
measures.
If the modulations reported in Figure 2 were driven by subjec-
tive estimates of value, then higher subjective-value ratings
should be associated with relatively large BOLD responses. On
the other hand, if the modulations in Figure 2 were driven
primarily by the reward history of each item—and not by an overt
representation of perceived value—then there should be little
correspondence between relative cortical activation levels and
subjective-value ratings. As shown in Figure 3C, selected stimuli
did evoke larger overall responses than unselected stimuli,
demonstrating sensitivity to modulations of the BOLD response
induced by selection (repeated-measures ANOVA testing main
effect of selected versus unselected stimuli, collapsed across
differential value levels and visual areas, F[1,13] = 40.3, p <
0.001; note that these are the same data shown in Figure 2G,
just sorted differently, so the larger responses associated with
selected stimuli are fully expected). However, the difference
between responses evoked by selected and unselected stimuli
did not increase as the subjective value of the selected stimulus
Figure 3. Influence of Subjective Value in Spatially Selective Regions
of Visual Cortex
(A) Relationship between differential value and the reported subjective value of
the selected stimulus (where 1 indicates low subjective value, and 3 indicates
high subjective value).
(B) Same function as in (A), but with switch trials removed from the analysis.
(C) Same data as in Figure 2G, but resorted to show activation levels evoked by
selected (black) and unselected (blue) stimuli as a function of subjective-value
ratings (averaged across all visual areas; see Figure S8 for data from individual
visual areas). The difference between responses evoked by selected and
unselected stimuli did not vary as the subjective value of the selected stimulus
increased.
(D) BOLD responses sorted by differential value (as in Figure 2G), but
computed based only on data from scans with a 1:1 red:green reward ratio.
Error bars reflect ± SEM across observers.Nincreased, as would be expected if estimates of subjective value
were driving the modulations shown in Figure 2 (see Figure 3C;
two-way repeated-measures ANOVA comparing responses
evoked by selected and unselected stimuli at each subjective
value level, F[2,26] = 0.08, p = 0.92; see also Figure S8 for
data from each visual area). A reanalysis of the data using a
GLM with an additional regressor marking the onset time of all
rewards (as in Figure 2H) did not alter this null result (F[2,26] =
0.1, p = 0.91).
The failure to find a relationship between subjective-value and
relative activation levels suggests that trial-by-trial changes in
the perceived probability of earning a reward were not driving
the modulations reported in Figure 2. However, it is possible
that observers generated a global estimate of subjective value
on a scan-by-scan basis, and that this sustained valuation
biased cortical activation in favor of the choice alternative that
was more likely to be rewarded over the course of an entire
scan. For example, observers might place more value on the
red stimulus during scans in which the red stimulus was three
times more likely to yield a reward than the green stimulus. In
turn, such sustained biases in subjective valuemay have contrib-
uted to the graded modulations shown in Figure 2 if high differ-
ential trials were primarily pulled from scans in which one stim-
ulus was rewarded more frequently than the other (i.e., scans
with a red:green reward ratio of 3:1 or 1:3 as opposed to scans
with a reward ratio of 1:1). To evaluate this possibility, observers
were asked to report which color wasmore valuable at the end of
each scan (using a two-alternative forced-choice procedure).
The more valuable color was reported with a high degree of
accuracy following scans in which there was a strong bias in
the reward ratio (mean correct guess rate ± SEM: 89% ± 5%
on 3:1 and 1:3 red:green reward ratio scans). Thus, observers
were generally aware of the global reward ratios that were in
effect on a scan-by-scan basis.
To determine whether this awareness of global reward ratios
was responsible for generating the modulations shown in
Figure 2, the influence of differential value on visual cortex
was reevaluated using only scans in which the average reward
ratio was 1:1 and sustained biases in subjective value should be
minimized. Regions of interest in IPS and FEF were excluded
from this analysis because they were only identified in one
hemisphere for many observers (see Table S2); therefore, there
was not enough data to estimate a reliable response from these
regions when considering only scans with a 1:1 reward ratio
(which reduced the size of the data set by 2/3). However,
reasonably robust estimates were available for all observers
from areas V1-hV4 after collapsing across corresponding
regions in the left and right hemisphere; the difference between
responses evoked by selected and unselected stimuli
increased as differential value increased, just as in Figure 2G
(Figure 3D; repeated-measures ANOVA comparing responses
evoked by selected versus unselected stimuli at each differen-
tial value level, F[4,52] = 2.93, p < 0.05). The observation of
value-based modulations even when the global probability of
reward for each alternative was fixed suggests that sustained
biases in subjective value that may have occurred on a scan-
by-scan basis do not account for the modulations shown in
Figure 2.euron 60, 1169–1181, December 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 1173
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of Spatially Selective Visual Cortex
The spatially selective visual areas described in the previous
section by definition represent stimuli in one circumscribed
region of the visual scene (although they may also represent
many different visual features of stimuli from within that circum-
scribed region, even in higher-order areas like IPS; e.g., Sereno
and Maunsell, 1998; Toth and Assad, 2002). Because spatial
position is independent of differential value in this task, and
because the spatial position of each stimulus is unknown at
the start of each trial, it stands to reason that modulations in
spatially selective regions of visual cortex are driven by biasing
signals that are generated elsewhere. In the context of the
present task, a putative control region should exhibit weak
biasing signals when differential value is low and spatially selec-
tive areas of visual cortex represent each alternative equally (see
Figure 2G). In contrast, strong biasing signals should be
observed when differential value is high and relative activation
levels in spatially selective areas of visual cortex favor the
more valuable alternative (for similar logic in the domain of
perceptual decision making, see, e.g., Heekeren et al., 2004;
Mazurek et al., 2003). A whole-brain random-effects group anal-
Figure 4. Whole-Brain Analysis Revealing
Representations of Differential Value
outside of Spatially Selective Regions of
Visual Cortex
Regions showing amonotonic rise in BOLD activa-
tion level with increasing differential value between
selected and unselected stimuli (see Table 1).
Note that the x axis on the line plots represents
the absolute value of the differential value. Line
plots are shown only to provide a graphical repre-
sentation of the monotonic rise of BOLD activation
levels; no additional inferences should be drawn
based on these plots, as the statistical contrast
used to identify the areas predetermined the
shape of the functions and the size of the error
bars (which reflect ± SEM across observers).
ysis was therefore used to identify
regions in which activation levels
increased as the absolute value of the
differential value between the stimuli
increased. To help ensure that these acti-
vation patterns reflected the influence of
prior rewards as opposed to the actual
presentation of a reward, an additional
regressor was included that marked the
onset time of all rewards (the same
approach that was used to generate
data in Figure 2H). Figure 4 shows the
locus of each activation, including bilat-
eral regions of inferior and middle frontal
gyrus (IFG/MFG), left superior frontal
sulcus (SFS), medial frontal cortex
(MFC), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC),
and bilateral inferior parietal sulcus/lobe
(IPS/IPL) (see Table 1). The identified
regions of left and right IPS were just lateral and inferior to the
average location of the spatially selective regions of IPS identi-
fied using the saccadic localizer task (see Table 1; Table S2).
In addition, none of these regions showed a positive response
to the presentation of a reward (all p values > 0.78) or to the
spatial position of the selected stimulus (all p values > 0.24 for
main effect of spatial location).
A whole-brain contrast was also performed to identify regions
that responded more to a central cue signaling the presentation
of a reward compared to a cue that signaled no reward (Figure 5;
Table 2). Replicating previous studies, the caudate nucleus and
a region of the midbrain encompassing the ventral tegmental
area (VTA) and substantia nigra (SN) were sensitive to the
presentation of rewards (e.g., D’Ardenne et al., 2008; Haruno
et al., 2004). However, the VTA/SN activation encompassed
a wide swath in the midbrain, so it was not possible to differen-
tiate the exact source(s) of the activation (see Figure 5). In addi-
tion, regions of the right insusla, right DLPFC, and large areas of
bilateral IPS were sensitive to the presentation of a reward. None
of these regions exhibited significant sensitivity to changes in
differential value (all p values > 0.18) or to the spatial position
of the selected stimulus (all p values > 0.34).1174 Neuron 60, 1169–1181, December 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.
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Several recent reports have documented value-based modula-
tions within areas of the visual system that are thought to play
a role in transforming incoming sensory information into an
appropriate motor response (e.g., Dorris and Glimcher, 2004;
Glimcher, 2003; Krawczyk et al., 2007; Platt and Glimcher,
1999; Sugrue et al., 2004, 2005). The present data show that
value also influences activation levels within early regions of
visual cortex that are thought to play a role in representing
low-level stimulus features (e.g., V1), even in the absence of
saccadic responses (see also Shuler and Bear, 2006). In addi-
tion, these modulations appear to be influenced primarily by
prior rewards as opposed to biases in the subjective value of
the selected stimulus that occurred on either a trial-by-trial or
a scan-by-scan basis. This result raises the intriguing possibility
that the value-basedmodulations across the visual hierarchy op-
erate largely via an implicit representation that is not necessarily
accessible to the observer. Finally, whereas regions of the
midbrain and dorsal striatum signal the presentation of rewards,
activation levels in regions of IFG/MFG, left SFS, medial frontal
cortex, PCC, and parietal cortex increase monotonically as
differential value increases. This sensitivity to differential value
makes the later areas suitable candidates for issuing biasing
signals so that valuable stimuli compete effectively for represen-
tation in the visual system.
Recently, Pleger and coworkers demonstrated that primary
somatosensory cortex is also modulated by reward-related
factors, suggesting that the present observations are not unique
to the visual system (Pleger et al., 2008; see also Pantoja et al.,
2007 for a related study in rats). However, the modulations re-
ported by Pleger et al. were tied specifically to the presentation
of the reward, as opposed to the processing of incoming somato-
Table 1. Coordinates and Volume of Regions Showing Increased
Activation with Increased Differential Value
Region t(13)
Mean
X
Mean
Y
Mean
Z
Std
X
Std
Y
Std
Z
Size
(ml)
RH IFG 3.42* 40 1.4 7.8 7.4 4.2 3.9 0.92
RH MFG 3.38* 43 21 9.3 3.3 1.9 6 0.62
RH IPS-
anterior
3.36* 40 66 23 3.7 5.1 2.8 1.48
RH IPS-
posterior
3.43* 21 77 36 2.1 2.6 4 0.51
LH MFG 3.64** 41 20 9.7 4 2.9 4.3 0.58
LH SFS 3.62** 17 50 32 3.1 5.5 6.8 1.81
LH IPS 3.69** 27 70 31 6.5 8.7 4.3 1.25
PCC-inferior 3.68** 2 50 11 8.6 6.7 6.4 4.44
PCC-dorsal 3.59** 2.3 36 40 4 12 6.4 4.76
Medial frontal 3.62** 2.3 42 15 5.7 10 6 7.08
T value refers to the significance of the linear trend relating the amplitude
of the BOLD response to increasing differential value (see Figure 4; coor-
dinates are from the atlas of Talairach and Tournoux, 1988). None of
these regions exhibited a significant amplitude increase related to the
presentation of a reward.
*p < .01, **p < .005.Nesensory information during the decision-making process. Thus,
their results aremore consistent with a delayed ‘‘teaching signal’’
that modifies synaptic efficacy in somatosensory cortex to facil-
itate future perceptual discriminations. In contrast, the present
data suggest that theprior reward history of a stimulusmodulates
the processing of incoming sensory information in the visual
domain (although the modulations reported here likely reflect
relatively fast reentrant processing). This apparent discrepancy
raises the possibility that value has differential effects on activa-
tion levels in visual and somatosensory cortices. However, it is
also possible that the observed differences are related to the
perceptual task that was employed: Pleger et al. (2008) used
a very difficult tactile discrimination task that may have benefited
substantially from reentrant learning signals. In contrast, the
present task was relatively trivial from a perceptual standpoint,
thus minimizing the need for perceptual learning. Future studies
that directly manipulate perceptual difficulty and that employ
converging methodologies with improved temporal resolution
such as EEG/MEG will likely be required to resolve this issue.
As shown in Figure 2, the differential value of the choice alter-
natives as determined by prior rewards biases activation levels
in spatially selective regions of the visual system even in the
absence of saccadic responses. Similar spatially selective
biasing effects have been reported in response to cues instruct-
ing shifts of spatial attention (Gandhi et al., 1999; Hopfinger et al.,
2000; Kastner et al., 1998; Serences and Yantis, 2007; Silver
et al., 2005) or to stimuli that are highly salient by virtue of their
emotional or social importance (Keil et al., 2005; Padmala and
Pessoa, 2008; Pourtois and Vuilleumier, 2006; Sabatinelli et al.,
2005; Sugase et al., 1999; Vuilleumier, 2005). Thus, stimulus
‘‘value’’ as defined in economic terms is but one of several
known factors that bias activation levels within the regions of
visual cortex that represent incoming sensory information from
the visual field.
Control Mechanisms of Value-Based Modulations
Decision making involves predicting and experiencing the
outcome of a particular behavior, and then using the outcome
to update future expectations. A complex network of subcortical
and cortical brain structures is thought to support different
component operations of this process. First, dopaminergic
neurons in the midbrain (e.g., VTA and SN) signal the difference
between predicted and experienced rewards in a relatively stim-
ulus-independent manner; behavior should be modified when
there is a large discrepancy between expected and actual
rewards, and should remain unchanged when expectations are
met (Hollerman and Schultz, 1998; Schultz et al., 1997). Accord-
ingly, dopaminergic neurons in the VTA and SN are more active
following an unexpected or infrequent reward and thus serve to
signal that a shift in behavioral strategy might be appropriate in
order to maximize the utility of future choices. These dopami-
nergic neurons send projections to the caudate nucleus, where
many neurons anticipate rewards and/or represent the specific
behavioral response that immediately preceded the presentation
of a reward (i.e., the direction of a rewarded saccade; Hikosaka,
2007; Lau and Glimcher, 2007; Lauwereyns et al., 2002; Schultz
et al., 1998). In turn, the caudate nucleus has extensive cortical
projections (in part through the thalamus) to occulomotor circuitsuron 60, 1169–1181, December 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 1175
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Representing Value in Human Cortex(e.g., LIP) as well as to regions of frontal cortex, where neurons
respond selectively and rapidly to the value of a stimulus (Leh
et al., 2007; Leon and Shadlen, 1999; Schilman et al., 2008;
Wallis and Miller, 2003). Together, this midbrain-striatal-cortical
network is thought to signal with increasing specificity the pres-
ence and precise nature of a rewarding stimulus as well as the
action(s) that led up to the reward (Hikosaka, 2007; Schultz,
1998).
As shown in Figure 5, many of the regions implicated in this
reward signaling circuit were found to respond more following
rewarded trials compared to unrewarded trials, including the
VTA/SN region, caudate nucleus, IPS (LIP), and DLPFC. This
general pattern of activation is consistent with themodel outlined
above in which midbrain neurons signal the presentation of
a reward, and striatal/cortical centers then act to utilize the
reward signal to appropriately modify future behavior. Note
that the region of the caudate nucleus identified here was insen-
sitive to the spatial position of the selected stimulus, even though
recent studies demonstrate that many caudate neurons encode
the specific saccade vector associated with a reward (e.g., Lau
and Glimcher, 2007). However, the present task did not employ
saccadic responses, and BOLD fMRI substantially blurs spatial
Figure 5. Whole-Brain Analysis Revealing
Regions outside of Spatially Selective
Regions of Visual Cortex that Respond
More on Rewarded Trials Compared to
Nonrewarded Trials
See Table 2.
selectivity within small cortical areas by
averaging signals from many neurons.
Thus, future studies will be needed to
more precisely characterize the role that
the caudate nucleus plays in signaling
response-reward pairings in the absence
of saccades.
The whole-brain analysis also revealed
regions of frontal and parietal cortex in
which activation levels increased as the
differential value between the alternatives
increased (Figure 4); many of these
regions have been previously implicated
in the anticipation and tracking of rewards
(e.g., left SFS, medial frontal cortex, and
PCC; Glascher et al., 2008; Haruno
et al., 2004; Kable and Glimcher, 2007;
Knutson and Cooper, 2005; Knutson
et al., 2000, 2005; Krawczyk et al., 2007;
O’Doherty, 2004). The monotonic rise in
activation levels with increasing differen-
tial value is an appropriate neural signa-
ture of regions involved in generating
biasing signals that modulate spatially
selective visual areas in favor of more
valuable stimuli (e.g., V1-hV4, IPS, and
FEF). For example, these regions may
integrate reward signals from the caudate nucleus and con-
nected cortical centers that refine the reward signals generated
bymidbrain dopaminergic neurons (e.g., Hollerman and Schultz,
1998; Schultz et al., 1998). Thus, if a stimulus is rewarded several
times over a relatively short period of time, then it is adaptive to
update the decision rule governing choice and to issue strong
biasing signals to spatially selective visual areas in order to
ensure that the more valuable alternative competes effectively
for representation in the visual system.
One region in particular—the left SFS—has been previously
implicated in decision making. Heekeren and coworkers used
fMRI and human observers to demonstrate that a similar region
(ormore generally, the DLPFC) was sensitive to both the differen-
tial and absolute amount of sensory evidence favoring one
choice alternative over another during perceptual decision-
making tasks (Heekeren et al., 2004, 2006). In addition, this deci-
sion-related activity is largely independent of the motor effector
being used to make a response (Heekeren et al., 2006), and
DLPFC neurons track stimulus value and participate in holding
information online during working memory delay periods (Barra-
clough et al., 2004; Fecteau et al., 2007; Fuster, 1995; Gilbert and
Fiez, 2004; Goldman-Rakic, 1987; Heekeren et al., 2004, 2006;1176 Neuron 60, 1169–1181, December 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.
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Krawczyk et al., 2007; Leon and Shadlen, 1999; Miller and Co-
hen, 2001; Tanaka et al., 2006; Tsujimoto and Sawaguchi,
2004, 2005; Wallis and Miller, 2003). The present study extends
the generality of these results by showing that the left SFS/
DLPFC represents the differential value of two stimuli that are
primarily distinguished by their respective reward histories.
This representation of differential value was not influenced by
the spatial position of the selected stimulus and is observed
even though the present study employed manual button-press
responses (see also Heekeren et al., 2006). Thus, the data
support the notion that the left SFS plays a domain general
role in indexing the relevant variable during decision making,
whether it is sensory evidence or a top-down factor like differen-
tial value. However, because fMRI is relatively coarse when it
comes to distinguishing fine-grained activation changes related
to making saccadic or manual responses in one direction or
another, the present data do not rule out a role for this region
in more precisely specifying the exact response that should be
made in an effort to optimize rewards.
An important question for future research concerns the degree
to which the neural systems that mediate spatially selective
responses associated with reward are dissociable from the
systems that mediate modulations associated with attention
and emotional salience. For instance, converging evidence
strongly implicates subregions of parietal cortex and the frontal
eye field in attentional control: fMRI studies reveal frontoparietal
activation concurrent with shifts of attention (reviewed in Cor-
betta and Shulman, 2002; Kastner andUngerleider, 2000; Seren-
ces and Yantis, 2006), damage to these regions can lead to
attentional deficits on the contralesional side of space (neglect;
Heilman and Valenstein, 1979; Mesulam, 1981), andmicrostimu-
lation and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) can bias the
locus of spatial attention as well as the firing rates of neurons
in early visual areas (Moore and Armstrong, 2003; Moore et al.,
2003;Moore and Fallah, 2004; Ruff et al., 2006, 2008). In contrast
to this frontoparietal attentional control network, the presenta-
tion of emotionally salient stimuli strongly activates the amygdala
Table 2. Coordinates and Volume of Regions Showing
Heightened Responses Following the Presentation of a Reward
Region t(13)
Mean
X
Mean
Y
Mean
Z
Std
X
Std
Y
Std
Z
Size
(ml)
RH-IPS 4.26** 37 50 40 6.3 7.9 6.2 8.20
RH-DLPFC 3.70** 41 26 31 3 3.2 5.3 1.22
RH-insula 3.94** 26 17 0.79 3.4 3.4 2.8 1.08
RH-SFS 3.43* 23 49 5.1 4 5.1 5.5 0.99
RH-caudate 3.72** 10 7.5 2.9 2 4.6 3.1 1.01
LH-IPS 4.1** 39 45 40 7.4 9.4 5.6 9.50
LH-caudate 3.75** 10 1.6 2.2 2.6 5.9 2.3 0.99
LH-putamen 3.53** 20 4.3 1.4 1.8 2.5 2.8 0.46
Precun 3.75** 4.1 67 32 2.6 2.6 2.1 0.63
See Figure 5; coordinates are from the atlas of Talairach and Tournoux,
1988. None of these regions exhibited a significant linear increase in
BOLD amplitude with differential value.
*p < .01, **p < .005.N(reviewed in Phelps and LeDoux, 2005), damage to the amygdala
attenuates emotional modulations but not attentional modula-
tions (Vuilleumier et al., 2004), damage to parietal cortex that
causes attentional neglect can spare emotional modulations of
visual cortex (Vuilleumier et al., 2002), and emotionally salient
stimuli that are ignored (unattended) can still evoke a relatively
large cortical response (Vuilleumier et al., 2001; although see
also Pessoa et al., 2002). The combined evidence therefore
suggests that the neural mechanisms mediating attention- and
emotion-based modulations of early visual cortex are at least
partially dissociable (Phelps et al., 2006; reviewed in Vuilleumier
and Driver, 2007).
Although no explicit comparison was carried out in the present
experiment, many of the regions depicted in Figure 4 have also
been implicated in attentional control. In particular, similar areas
of parietal cortex are activated during voluntary shifts of attention
between spatial locations, features, and objects (reviewed in
Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; Serences and Yantis, 2006), and
similar regions of IFG/MFG have been associated with attention
shifts following the unexpected presentation of a behaviorally
relevant stimulus (Downar et al., 2001; Kincade et al., 2005;
Serences et al., 2005). These results raise the possibility that
overlapping neural mechanisms play a role in orienting to stimuli
based on either attentional demands or on stimulus value as
determined by recently earned rewards. Alternatively, spatial
orienting in general may recruit a common set of neural mecha-
nisms to bias the representation of incoming sensory informa-
tion. To clarify this issue, future studies should test the link
between neural mechanisms mediating attention and value by
directly comparing the two types of orienting within the same
experimental setting to determine the extent to which the
‘‘control’’ systems overlap. Ideally, these studies might employ
neuroimaging and TMS/lesion methodologies to more precisely
establish causal roles for each region in issuing biasing signals to
spatially selective regions of visual cortex (see, e.g., Ruff et al.,
2006, 2008; Vuilleumier et al., 2004 for examples of such
approaches).
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Observers
Fifteen neurologically intact right-handed observers (nine females), ranging in
age from 22 to 28 years old, participated in the study. All observers gave
written informed consent in accord with the human subjects Institutional
Review Board at the University of California, Irvine. Data from one observer
(female) were discarded due to technical difficulties collecting button-press
responses in the scanner. Each observer was trained for two 1 hr sessions
outside the scanner and then participated in a single 1.5 hr scanning session.
Compensation was $10/hour for training and $20/hour for scanning.
Observers could also earn a monetary bonus based on behavioral perfor-
mance during the scanning session (see below for details).
Main Experimental Task
Observers maintained gaze on a small square fixation point (0.4 visual angle
on a side) that was continuously visible in the center of the screen throughout
each scan. At the start of each trial, contrast reversing checkerboards (8 Hz)
were presented within circular apertures (4 radius) for 1 s on each side of fixa-
tion, centered 10 to the left and right and 5 above the center of the screen.
One of the checkerboard stimuli was composed of green and black squares,
and the other of red and black squares; the spatial position (left or right of fixa-
tion) of each colored stimulus varied in a pseudo-random order across trialseuron 60, 1169–1181, December 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 1177
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position over the course of a single block of trials. Observers held two MR-
compatible keypads, one in each hand, and each keypad contained three
buttons. Following the offset of the checkerboards, observers pressed one
of the three buttons with the hand corresponding to the spatial position of
the selected color. Thus, when the right stimulus was selected, observers
pressed the rightmost of the three buttons held in their right hand to signal
a high-value choice, the middle button to indicate a medium-value choice,
and the inner button to indicate a low-value choice; a complementary pattern
was used to indicate subjective value when the left stimulus was selected. The
observers were required to respond within 1.25 s following the offset of the
stimuli. Following the responsewindow, the central fixation point turned yellow
for 0.25 s if the choice was rewarded or blue for 0.25 s if the choice was not
rewarded. The next trial began 1.25 s later, yielding a trial duration of 3.75 s.
There were 96 trials in each block, but one quarter were ‘‘null’’ trials on which
no stimulus was presented to aid in the estimation of the event-locked hemo-
dynamic response function (Dale, 1999). The sequence of real and null trials on
each run was selected from a set of the 50 most statistically efficient pseudo-
random sequences as determined usingMonte Carlo simulations (Dale, 1999).
Reward Structure and Payment Scheme
On average, a reward was assigned to a stimulus on 33% of the trials; this
average reward rate was distributed in a red:green ratio of either 1:3, 1:1, or
3:1 (expressed in percentage of trials, these ratios were approximately
8%:25%, 16%:16%, or 25%:8%). Although all observers experienced the
same reward ratios over the course of the experiment, the order of presenta-
tion was randomly determined for each observer with the constraint that the
same ratio was used on two consecutive blocks of trials (e.g., observer 1might
experience red:green reward ratios of {1:1, 1:1, 3:1, 3:1, 1:3, 1:3} over the
course of the six scans that were run during an experimental session).
Rewards were assigned to each color in an independent and stochastic
manner on each trial, so the actual number of rewards assigned to each color
deviated to some extent on a given block. Once a reward was assigned to
a color, the reward remained available until that option was selected. As
a result, the probability that selecting a given color would yield a reward
increased as a function of the time since that option was last chosen. This
‘‘baiting’’ scheme was adopted to ensure that observers would not simply
pick the color with the highest perceived reward probability on every single trial
(i.e., to encourage exploration). Finally, a reward was never given on trials
where the subject switched from one alternative to the other. Although not
strictly necessary to observe matching behavior (Lau and Glimcher, 2005),
this change over delay (COD) was introduced to discourage ‘‘win stay, loose
switch’’ strategies (Corrado et al., 2005; Sugrue et al., 2004). As a result, trials
following a switch were not considered further in the analysis because they
were not free choices. At the end of the scanning session, observers were
given $0.10 for every reward they earned up to amaximum of $10; eight partic-
ipants earned the maximum (mean total income, $10.85) and the remaining six
earned an average of $9.60. Overall, observers obtained 69% ± 1.4% (mean ±
SEM) of all available rewards (where 100% is unachievable because both
stimuli were assigned a reward on some trials, and only one of the stimuli could
be selected). See section ‘‘Model Relating Reward History to Choice
Behavior’’ in Supplemental Experimental Procedures to see the full details of
the model used for estimating value based on previous rewards.
fMRI Data Acquisition and Analysis
MRI scanning was carried out on a Phillips Intera 3-Tesla scanner equipped
with an eight-channel head coil at the University of California, Irvine. Anatom-
ical images were acquired using an MPRAGE T1-weighted sequence
that yielded images with a 1 3 1 3 1 mm resolution. Whole-brain echo planar
functional images (EPI) were acquired in 35 transverse slices (TR = 2000 ms,
TE = 30 ms, flip angle = 70, image matrix = 64 3 64, field of view = 240 mm,
slice thickness = 3 mm, 1 mm gap, SENSE factor = 1.5).
Data analysis was performed using BrainVoyager QX (version 1.91; Brain
Innovation, Maastricht, The Netherlands) and custom time-series analysis
routines written in Matlab (version 7.1; The Math Works, Natick, MA, USA).
Data from the main experiment were collected in six scans per subject, with
each scan lasting 372 s; each functional localizer scan lasted for 300 s (see1178 Neuron 60, 1169–1181, December 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier InSupplemental Experimental Procedures). EPI images were slice time cor-
rected, motion corrected (both within and between scans), and high pass
filtered (3 cycles/run) to remove low-frequency temporal components from
the time series. The estimated motion parameters were then used to estimate
and remove motion-induced artifacts in the time series of each voxel using
a general linear model. All EPI and anatomical images were transformed into
the standardized atlas space of Talairach and Tournoux (1988) to enable the
whole-brain group analysis described below.
Themagnitude of the evoked BOLD response in each region of interest (ROI)
in visual cortex (see section on functional localizers in Supplemental Experi-
mental Procedures) was estimated using a GLM and a design matrix that
modeled the response to each event type as the scalar multiplier (beta weight)
of a canonical double-gamma function (double-gamma function was imple-
mented in Brain Voyager: time to peak 5 s, undershoot ratio 6, time to under-
shoot peak 16 s). This approach to estimating the magnitude of the response
evoked by selected and unselected stimuli in each value bin was chosen to
correspond to the method chosen for estimating the influence of differential
value in the whole-brain analysis described below (see Figures 4 and 5).
However, qualitatively similar and statistically significant results were also ob-
tained using a finite impulse response function (FIR) approach to estimate the
event-related response in each category on a time point-by-time point basis
(e.g., Dale, 1999).
Whole-Brain Analysis
To examine the representations of differential value outside of spatially selective
regions of occipital, parietal (IPS), and frontal cortex (FEF), a whole-brain
random-effects group analysis was carried out after applying a 4 mm FWHM
spatial smoothing kernel to the functional data from each observer. A GLM
wasdefinedwithcanonicalHRFs (samedouble-gammashapedescribedabove)
marking the onset time of trials belonging to eachof five bins based on the abso-
lute value of the differential value, and a separate regressor was included that
marked the onset time of all rewards to account for variance in the BOLD signal
induced by the actual presentation of a reward (see, e.g., Figures 2H and 5). A
balanced contrast that weighted each regressor with respect to its correspond-
ingdifferential valuebin (contrast coefficients of [2,1, 0, 1, 2]) wasused tofind
voxels that showedan increasing responseamplitudewith increasingdifferential
value. The mean position of the activations is reported in Table 1 and all coordi-
nates correspond to the atlas of Talairach and Tournoux (1988). The single-voxel
statistical thresholdwas set to t(13)= 3.05,p<0.01andaminimumcluster sizeof
16 edge-contiguous voxels (0.432 ml) was adopted to correct for multiple
comparisons, yielding a map-wise false-positive probability of p < 0.05 (as
computed based on all voxels included in the GLM using the AFNI program Al-
phaSim, written by Robert Cox). However, all areas except the left putamen
also passed a more stringent cluster threshold of 19 voxels, which corresponds
to a map-wise false-positive probability of p < 0.01.
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA
Supplemental Data include nine figures, two tables, and experimental proce-
dures and can be found with this article online at http://www.cell.com/neuron/
supplemental/S0896-6273(08)00951-3.
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